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Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and its 
implementing concept, Sea Base Logistics (SBL), stress the 
need for logistically supporting forces ashore directly 
from a sea base.  This study analyzes the capability of a 
current LHD-class amphibious ship to sustain a force 
deployed ashore through direct ship-to-objective movement 
of sustainment requirements.  This study presents a 
baseline simulation model to estimate the ability of a LHD 
to deliver the required logistic support.  Experiments were 
conducted with various scenarios and distances between the 
deployed forces and the nominal Sea Base (LHD).  
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the effects 
of various parameters on the ability of the Sea Base to 
successfully accomplish the given scenarios with the 
specified conditions.  Results indicate a substantial 
increase in the number of aircraft, operational 
availability of those aircraft, and/or a substantial 
reduction in sustainment requirements are needed in order 
to successfully accomplish the stated scenarios of this 
study.  The results of this study could support the design 
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The end of the Cold War necessitated changes to the 
United States’ National Security Strategy (NSS).  The 
relative simplicity that a single, identifiable enemy with 
worldwide military capabilities and foreign policy 
objectives brought to the NMS was gone.  The order of the 
Cold War was replaced by a new order characterized by 
uncertainty.  This uncertainty resulted from instability 
caused by nations striving for regional hegemony, the 
dissolution of numerous other states resulting in 
humanitarian disasters, and the rise of internal, national 
conflicts based on religious and ethnic differences. 
This new order of uncertainty and strife required the 
United States to drastically alter its NSS.  The United 
States would no longer be able to concentrate solely on 
defeating the USSR.  Instead, the United States would have 
to be able to counter instability, regional conflicts and 
humanitarian disasters anywhere around the world at any 
time in order to sustain the strategic advantage it gained 
at the end of the Cold War.  Rather than World War III, the 
United States now expected to be involved in expeditionary 
operations covering the entire range of conflict intensity.  
And, since 75 percent of the world’s population and 80 
percent of national capitals are located in littoral 
regions, the littoral region can reasonably be expected to 
be the battleground of the near future where the United 
States’ expeditionary operations will take place. 
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The transition of strategic focus from blue-water to 
littoral operations for the United States Navy and Marine 
Corps began in 1992 with its publication of “from the Sea”.  
This was followed by publication of a second publication in 
1994 entitled “Forward…from the Sea” which further expanded 
the concepts of littoral operations.  The Marine Corps 
continued to develop the littoral operations concept by 
creating a new vision for its most significant mission:  
amphibious assault.  The vision was entitled Operational 
Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). [Ref. 14] 
The OMFTS concept seeks to create and maintain a high 
operational tempo that overwhelms the enemy by striking 
directly from the sea at a center of gravity of the enemy.  
Striking the enemy directly from the sea accomplishes 
several objectives for the striking force.  It avoids the 
traditional beach assault and logistics buildup required 
before the assault force can move against operational 
objectives.  It maintains the element of surprise for the 
assault forces.  It allows the assault force to exploit the 
maneuver space offered by the sea rather than having to 
create this space ashore by force.  And it forces the enemy 
to defend all of his centers of gravity rather than only 
the beaches suitable for an assault stretching his forces 
thinner. [Ref 14] 
However, despite the elimination of the logistics 
buildup requirement on the beachhead, the assault forces 
must still be logistically supported.  And they must be 
supported over a potentially wider area since the assault 
force may be attacking widely separated operational 
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objectives.  To this end the Sea Based Logistics (SBL) 
concept has been developed to support OMFTS. 
Under SBL, the Marine forces inserted ashore will be 
supported from the ships at sea rather than the traditional 
shore based Combat Service Support Areas (CSSA).  Logistics 
material will be delivered directly from the Sea Base to 




The objective of this study is to analyze the 
capability of a current LHD-class ship to provide sustained 
logistic support to Marine units deployed ashore under the 
OMFTS concept.   
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The central research question of this study is: what 
scenario conditions, or parameters, most critically impact 
the ability of a LHD-class ship to provide the basic 
sustainment requirements (food, water, fuel, ammunition) 
for a typical Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations 
Capable (MEU(SOC)) executing operational missions? 
Sustainment requirements that must be determined 
include: 
• What is the daily logistics requirement (food, water, 
fuel, ammunition) for a MEU(SOC)? 
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• Given the embarked lift capacity of a LHD (CH-53 
and/or MV-22) what is the required cycle time to 
deliver the required logistics requirements? 
 
• Given these sustainment requirements, this study will 
examine the impact of altering the value of various 
assumption parameters such as: 
1.  the force package deployed in support of 
      different operations, 
2.  an increase in the number of aviation assets, 
3.  the distance between the ships of the Sea Base 
      and the deployed Marine units. 
 
D. SCOPE 
The focus of this research is to determine conditions 
that most impact the ability of our current and imminent 
inventory of Sea Base aviation and ship assets to sustain 
likely force packages deployed ashore.  Determining this 
should then help point the way towards changes either in 
tactics and/or equipments necessary to ensure the 
feasibility and success of the OMFTS concept of operations.  
A secondary purpose of this research was to create a 
simulation of logistics sustainment operations under the 
OMFTS concept that could be used to model most future 
operations in advance as a planning aid. 
Because the research focuses on the sustainment of 
forces, the actual deployment of those forces was ignored.  
It was assumed that the Marines were able to successfully 
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insert their forces in accordance with OMFTS.  
Additionally, any air cover missions that might be required 
for the logistics flights were ignored because of the 
additional complexity that would have been brought to the 
simulation.  However, attrition for the logistics delivery 
airframes resulting from maintenance as well as enemy 
action is built into the simulation to closer approximate 
reality. 
Surface delivery of logistic materiel was also ignored 
in this study.  This was done to restrict the simulation to 
the strictest interpretation of OMFTS where absolutely no 
beachhead exists.  If materiel were to be delivered anyway 
when no beachhead exists, there would then exist 
requirements for additional vehicles and personnel to be 
ashore to further transport the materiel on to the forces 
farther inland.  This also assumes that those forces are 
reachable by passable roads.  These transport forces would 
also create the requirement for secure interior lines of 
communication and delivery or at a minimum some sort of 
force protection and a secure laager as well.  These 
requirements, in turn, would require more forces and lead 
us back towards the current amphibious assault doctrine and 
its CSSA approach. 
Finally, a review of another pertinent thesis 
indicated that surface transport was only required at 
longer distances (> 100nm) from the shore to sustain the 
assumed deployed force package.  However, the longer 
standoff distance required that significant logistics 
assets be placed ashore in order to increase the amount of 
on-hand days of supply for the forces ashore to counter the 
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increased shuttle time of the surface transports. [Ref 6]  
And, again this begins to lead us back to current assault 
doctrine and away from OMFTS principles. 
 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
Research included a review of the OMFTS, Ship-to-
Objective Maneuver (STOM), and SBL concepts, and a review 
of previous Master’s Theses addressing OMFTS sustainment 
operations.  This was accomplished through a literature 
search of books, research documents, doctrinal publications 
and other library information resources.  Completing this 
research also required developing plausible operational 
scenarios, creating a simulation model with Arena 
simulation software for the scenarios, analyzing the 
results of the simulation and making recommendations for 
future research and development. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This chapter provided a general description of the 
project, the objectives of the research, the research 
question, the scope and limitations of the research 
project, and a brief description of the research 
methodology.  Subsequent chapters are organized as follows: 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF OMFTS AND SBL 
III. SCENARIO 
IV. SIMULATION MODEL 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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II. OVERVIEW OF OMFTS AND SBL 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The methods and concepts of armed conflict are in a 
constant state of change.  This results from a continuous 
flux in both the strategic and technologic environments 
that frame potential conflicts for which a nation must 
prepare.  This state of flux requires a nation to 
continually refine and update the strategic, operational 
and tactical doctrines and operational concepts it expects 
to use in time of war against its expected and unexpected 
enemies.  The United States now finds itself in a time of 
great change to both its strategic and technologic 
environment. 
The end of the Cold War brought a huge amount of 
strategic uncertainty to the United States and the rest of 
the world.  During the Cold War individual nations had been 
prevented or dissuaded by the two superpowers by any means 
necessary from beginning a conflict that could bring the 
two powers into conflict and possible nuclear exchange.  
Now, those nations could choose to pursue their national 
security or other objectives through force.  The result has 
been a seemingly constant stream of conflicts and 
humanitarian disasters involving the United States’ as it 
pursues its own national interests.  The strategic forecast 
for the foreseeable future is more of the same. 
In addition to the flux of the strategic environment 
since the end of the Cold War, there have also been great 
technological changes in the last decade.  Information 
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gathering, management and dissemination methods and 
equipments have been revolutionized.  In addition, 
conventional weapons have become more lethal and the 
mobility of forces on the battlefield has significantly 
increased [Ref 13].  The armed services of the United 
States have sought to leverage these advances to improve 
its ability to execute its assigned missions. 
Facing these fundamental changes in both the strategic 
and technologic environments, the United States Navy and 
Marine Corps were forced to develop a new service strategy 
that would provide the best support to the nation’s 
National Security Strategy.  This new naval strategy was 
first outlined in 1992 with the publication of “…From the 
Sea”.  In this document the Navy recognized the changes to 
the strategic environment and looked to move its emphasis 
away from traditional open-ocean warfighting.  Instead, the 
focus for the service shifted to joint operations conducted 
from the littoral regions of the world and the projection 
of power from the sea to the shore. [Ref 12] 
In 1994, the Navy published “Forward…From the Sea”.  
This document updated and expanded the strategic concepts 
from the earlier white paper.  It also stressed the 
importance of the Navy in preventing conflicts through 
forward deployments as well as the role of the Navy in 
humanitarian operations. [Ref 13] 
The Marine Corps outlined its vision for operations in 
the littoral region in 1996.  It built upon the foundation 
laid down by the Navy’s two concept papers and was entitled 
“Operational Maneuver From the Sea”. 
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B. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA (OMFTS) 
In order to adapt to the changes in the strategic and 
technologic environment following the end of the Cold War, 
the Marine Corps developed OMFTS.  OMFTS targets the 
littoral regions of the world as the arenas where the most 
important conflicts of the future will occur.  Littoral 
regions are 
 
those areas characterized by great cities, well-
populated coasts, and the intersection of trade routes 
where land and sea meet…littorals provide homes to over 80 
percent of the world’s capital cities and nearly all of the 
marketplaces for international trade [Ref 14]. 
 
OMFTS stresses that in order to influence world 
events, the United States requires a “credible, forwardly 
deployable, power projection capability” [Ref 12].  OMFTS 
further presses the need for this capability to be free of 
land bases and the restraints and constraints that come 
with use of those bases. 
 
…a sustainable forcible entry capability that is 
independent of forward staging bases, friendly borders, 
overflight rights, and other politically dependent support 
can come only from the sea [Ref 14]. 
 
In support of this goal, OMFTS envisioned rapid 
maneuver by assault forces from their ships directly to 
operational objectives ashore.  Attacking objectives 
directly from the sea allows the Naval Commander to use the 
sea as maneuver space and turns the enemy’s coastline into 
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a vulnerable flank rather than a barrier to entry.  Under 
OMFTS the landing force is expected to create and maintain 
operational surprise, generate overwhelming tempo, and 
overmatch enemy weaknesses with its power and rapid 
execution in order to keep the enemy off-balance resulting 
in a quick, successful assault.  This replaces the current 
amphibious methods of beach assault that require 
operational phases, pauses, and reorganizations that impose 
delays and inefficiencies on the operation. [Ref 15] 
As the Marine Corps continued to develop OMFTS, it 
began to focus on the implementation of the concept.  To 
that end two additional documents were issued.  “Ship-To-
Objective Maneuver”, published in 1997, addressed the 
tactical level of the OMFTS concept and “Seabased 
Logistics”, published in 1998, addressed the logistic 
sustainment of the forces sent ashore. 
 
C. SHIP-TO-OBJECTIVE MANEUVER (STOM) 
STOM is one of the key implementing concepts to 
achieve the operational goals established by OMFTS.  STOM 
defines the principles and tactics of forcible entry from 
the sea.  Two key components of STOM are the tactical 
maneuver of forces and seabasing. 
Historically, amphibious warfare sought to move forces 
ashore methodically from the ships onto a beachhead via a 
slow-moving shuttle system.  Forces would then expand out 
from the beachhead to seize intermediate and final 
operational objectives.  However, this method was slow and 
restricted in its maneuver space and extremely vulnerable 
to enemy counterattacks.  Until sufficient forces could be 
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lodged ashore and begin to develop operational momentum, 
the assault force was in a precarious position. 
STOM seeks to change this ship-to-shore movement to 
amphibious maneuver. 
 
Specifically, it will allow for conducting combined 
arms penetration and exploitation operations from over the 
horizon directly to objectives ashore without stopping to 
seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones 
[Ref 14]. 
 
The objective of STOM is to put combat units ashore 
either by air, surface or both means in fighting formation 
in sufficient force and in the decisive place in order to 
accomplish the mission.  The capability to operate from 
over the horizon (OTH) coupled with the ability to strike 
deep inland directly at centers of gravity will force the 
enemy to defend a vastly larger area and provide the 
attacking forces with tactical surprise. [Ref 15] 
STOM also emphasizes using the sea as a maneuver 
space.  Using the sea in this manner allows the landing 
force to take advantage of the enemy’s gaps by taking the 
axis of advance of their own choosing rather than one 
dictated by the topography of the coastal area. [Ref 14] 
Another key aspect of STOM is seabasing.  Under the 
STOM concept command and control, logistics and fire 
support remain at sea.  Seabasing these functions produces 
several advantages for the OMFTS force. [Ref 15] 
First, by keeping these functions at sea, they are 
invulnerable to attack from enemy ground forces.  Second, 
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forces that would normally be tied up defending the 
facilities and Marines executing these functions can now be 
included in the direct assault force.  Besides increasing 
the size and effectiveness of the assault force, this also 
serves to increase their mobility since they will not be 
tied to specific geographic areas, such as a beachhead or 
Combat Service Support Area (CSSA).  Lastly, fewer ground 
troops sent ashore also means a reduced logistic 
sustainment requirement ashore for the assault force.  This 
means fewer air or water craft have to be sent in to the 
shore exposing them and their personnel to loss or damage 
from enemy action or accident.  Fewer sustainment sorties 
also free up aircraft for other combat duties, again 
increasing the combat power and effectiveness of the 
assault force. [Ref 15] 
 
D. SEABASED LOGISTICS (SBL) 
 The success of STOM and OMFTS hinges on the ability to 
effectively seabase the logistic functions of the assault 
force. 
 
By providing sustainment to operating forces ashore 
directly from an over the horizon base at sea, Seabased 
Logistics will allow the vision of Operational Maneuver 
From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) 
to become reality [Ref 16]. 
 
Employing logistics directly from the ship to the 
objective will eliminate the requirements for beachheads.  
This will eliminate the resulting operational pause while 
sufficient supplies build up on the beachhead and also the 
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need for dedicated shore-based force protection for the 
logistics area. 
Additionally, expectations are that future 
battlefields  
 
will be characterized by coordinated speed of 
maneuver, increased operating ranges, and precision 
delivery of massed effects.  Seabased Logistics offers the 
unique capability to both sustain the future high optempo 
battlefield and exploit the advantages inherent in mobility 
and over the horizon standoff [Ref 16]. 
 
 There are five critical canons of SBL that must be 
implemented in order to properly sustain an amphibious 
assault force operating under OMFTS and STOM concepts.  
These elements are primacy of the sea base, reduced demand, 
in-stride sustainment, adaptive response and joint 
operations, and force closure and reconstitution at sea. 
[Ref 16] 
 
1. Primacy of the Sea Base 
The primacy of seabasing will be its ability to build, 
project, and sustain combat power.  Forces will be 
assembled and sent ashore directly from the sea base, but 
most important, those same forces will be sustained from 
the sea base. 
The sea base will be “an integrated over the horizon 
floating distribution center and workshop providing 
indefinite sustainment” [Ref 16].  The sea base is 
envisioned to possess the ability to provide all combat 
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service support functions afloat instead of ashore. [Ref 
16] 
Maneuver units will carry their initial support 
requirements with them in limited, mobile combat service 
support units and the sea base will then sustain them 
indefinitely by surface or by air as necessary.  The sea 
base will then be replenished directly from sources in the 
continental United States (CONUS) or from around the world. 
[Ref 16] 
With the reduced logistics footprint ashore, much of 
the double or triple handling of equipment and supplies in 
a CSSA arrangement will be eliminated.  Additionally, a 
lack of immobile, shore-based logistics areas will also 
allow the logistics base to maneuver at sea with the 
operating forces.  It will also free the forces ashore from 
protecting those logistics areas and subsequent interior 
lines of communications, allowing for greater operational 
initiative and maneuver freedom for the Naval Commander and 
the assault forces. [Ref 16] 
Maintenance for both aviation and ground combat 
equipment will be critical to maintaining a high 
operational tempo for extended periods as well as the 
ability to reconstitute equipment after an operation has 
been completed.  The sea base will provide at least the 
intermediate maintenance capability and will have access to 
spare parts through its sustainment network or by on-site 
fabrication. [Ref 16] 
Seabasing the logistics also frees the amphibious 
force from the constraints and restraints associated with 
overseas basing rights and host nation support. 
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2. Reducing Logistics Demand 
SBL will increase logistics efficiency and support 
through reduced demand on transportation and materiel 
resources.  Improvements in operating efficiencies, 
reliability of equipment, precision ordnance and targeting, 
improved and alternate fuel efficiencies, should reduce 
demands for sustainment ashore.  Improved information 
technology and rapid distribution will reduce the CSSA 
inventory stockpile ashore and allow sustainment materiel 
to be sent directly to the end user from the sea base. [Ref 
16] 
Demand will also be reduced because the command, fire 
support and combat service support functions will be 
located on the sea base.  This reduces the footprint of 
forces ashore, thus reducing sustainment requirements, in 
particular fuel and ammunition requirements.  Furthermore 
consolidating supplies aboard the sea base allows the 
amphibious force to carry fewer inventories. [Ref 16] 
Demand reduction resulting from a more efficient 
employment of logistics resources will result in an 
increase in the numbers of fighting forces, combat power 
and agility that can be sustained ashore. [Ref 16] 
 
3. In-Stride Sustainment 
 In-stride sustainment refers to the ability to provide 
sustainment materiel to fighting units without those units 
having to remain in place or withdraw to a rear area to 
assess and communicate its sustainment requirements. 
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 Under this tenet of SBL highly automated requisition 
and distribution management systems will reduce costs and 
human interface and accelerate materiel movement.  Total 
asset visibility will increase knowledge of materiel in-
transit to the maneuver units as well as the on-hand 
inventories of those units.  As a result, the fighting 
units will pull only the required sustainment materiel 
forward rather than large quantities of all materiels being 
pushed to the field in case it is needed.  This “demand-
based” system will lower inventory levels, allow for a 
management by exception approach to sustainment, and 
increase the efficiency of the logistics distribution 
system. [Ref 16] 
 
4. Adaptive Response and Joint Operations 
“Seabased Logistics will be fully capable of 
integrating with Theater Logistics” [Ref 16].  Major joint 
operations ashore may require the establishment of selected 
shore-based logistics systems.  The sea base offers a means 
to initiate Joint Theater Logistics operations ashore.  As 
initial operations expand and sustainment requirements 
exceed the capacity of seabased support, SBL will provide 
the ability to establish and maintain land bases for 
expanded operations and rapid closure of follow-on forces. 
[Ref 16] 
 
5. Force Closure and Reconstitution at Sea 
“Seabased force closure is the at sea arrival, 
assembly, and integration of operational forces to realize 
their combat power and coordinate associated logistics 
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sustainment” [Ref 16].  Combat forces and their associated 
equipment will be merged at sea prior to deployment ashore.  
Initial operational capability will be achieved prior to 
contact with the enemy and combat power will increase with 
the incorporation of any follow-on forces as they arrive.  
This eliminates the need for access to secure overseas 
ports and/or airfields to accomplish this necessary step 
and helps preserve tactical surprise for the assault 
forces. [Ref 16] 
SBL will also reduce the time required for force 
reconstitution by retaining the command control, fire 
support and logistics forces afloat throughout an 
operation.  The advancements in storage, distribution, and 
information technology will speed the return of forces to 
the sea base.  This will provide the Naval Commander with 
greater flexibility to deal with any emergent situations.  
The interface with CONUS-based pipelines will allow the 
force to replenish personnel, equipment, ordnance and 
sustainment materiel and allow for those items needing 
significant maintenance to return to CONUS. [Ref 16] 
Integral to the reconstitution of forces is the 
maintenance capability of the sea base.  As mentioned 
previously, the sea base will have at least an intermediate 
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III.  SCENARIO 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to test the parameters that critically impact 
the ability of a LHD-class ship to provide basic 
sustainment requirements (food, water, fuel, ammunition) to 
a typical MEU(SOC) under the OMFTS concept, the scenarios 
under which the MEU(SOC) of the model are operating must 
first be outlined. 
 
B. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
For this analysis to provide any meaningful results, 
there are a few requirements that the scenarios used in the 
simulation model must meet.  First, the scenarios must be 
plausible.  The range of missions the study’s MEU(SOC) are 
tasked with must be realistic and connected to the current 
strategic environment.  Secondly, the forces actually sent 
ashore to accomplish the assigned mission must be realistic 
and commensurate with executing the mission.  Thirdly, the 
underlying assumptions that govern the activity of the 
MEU(SOC) must be in accordance with the OMFTS concepts of 
operation. 
With these requirements met, the objective of the 
chosen scenarios then is to provide different volumes of 
sustainment requirements.  So, from the mission that the 
MEU(SOC) is assumed to be engaged in, we develop the likely 
force structure required to execute the mission.  The size 
and inventory of the force structure then determines the 
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quantities of supplies that must be delivered ashore to 
sustain the forces executing the mission. 
Once the volume of sustainment requirements for each 
mission is determined, the simulation model will be used to 
determine what scenario conditions, or parameters, most 
critically impact the ability of a LHD-class ship to 
provide the basic sustainment requirements to the forces 
ashore. 
To test these parameters, each of the three volumes of 
sustainment requirements (derived from the different 
missions) will be run through the simulation model with a 
variety of distances between the Sea Base and the forces 
ashore to determine what percentage of the sustainment 
requirements can be delivered on a daily basis.  Following 
this, sensitivity analysis will be done on the missions and 
distances where the 100 percent of the sustainment 
requirements could not be delivered.  This will be done to 
determine if increasing the number of aviation assets or 
utilizing more take-off/landing spots at the Sea Base would 
improve the daily delivery percentage. 
As an example, one of the missions is a humanitarian 
mission.  For the study, the sustainment requirements for 
the forces required for the mission are input into the 
simulation.  Then a distance of 50 miles between the Sea 
Base and the forces is also input into the simulation 
model.  The simulation is then run numerous times to 
determine the percentage of the requirements that can be 
delivered each day.  An average percentage for each day is 
then calculated.  For those days where, on average, 100 
percent of the sustainment requirements cannot be 
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delivered, the simulation is rerun using increasing numbers 
of aviation assets.  This is then repeated with the number 
of take-off/landing spots at the Sea Base. 
As a result, the key parameters of the scenario 
include the forces deployed ashore, the type of mission 
executed, the distance between the Sea Base and the 
deployed forces, the aviation resources of the Sea Base, 
the sustainment requirements of the deployed forces and 
other major assumptions that affect the scenario. 
 
1. Forces 
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the 
principal organization used by the Marine Corps for 
missions that span the range of military operations.  The 
MAGTF is composed of four elements: a command element (CE), 
a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element 
(ACE) and a combat service support element (CSSE).  The 
MAGTF can vary in size from the Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) that is comprised of a full Division and Air Wing 
down to the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that contains a 
single Battalion and an Aviation Squadron. 
The standard forward deployed Marine expeditionary 
organization, however, is the MEU(SOC).  The (SOC) 
appellation is applied to the MEU following completion of a 
rigorous pre-deployment training program and demonstration 
of proficiency in executing various missions that span the 
range of operations the MEU may encounter. 
The MEU CE is the standing headquarters and staff of 
the deployed forces.  It is augmented for deployment by 
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elements of Force Reconnaissance, an Intelligence Company, 
and a Communications Battalion. [Ref 7] 
The MEU GCE is a Battalion Landing Team (BLT).  A BLT 
is built around an infantry battalion with its staff, three 
Rifle Companies, a Weapons Company, and an organic 
communications section.  It is augmented with an artillery 
battery, a combat engineer platoon, a Light Armored 
Reconnaissance Company, an Assault Amphibian platoon, and 
in some instances a section of Tanks.  In this simulation 
the Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAAV) is used 
instead of the current AAVs in service because the AAAV is 
identified as a key component of OMFTS. [Ref 7] 
The MEU ACE is designated as a Composite Squadron.  It 
is normally built around a Marine Medium Helicopter 
Squadron (HMM) of 12 CH-46 Sea Knights.  However, the CH-46 
is scheduled to be replaced by the MV-22 Osprey and 
therefore the MV-22 is used in the simulation model of this 
study.  The HMM is augmented by four CH-53E Sea Stallions 
from a Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron as well as three 
UH-1N utility helicopters and four AH-1W Sea Cobra attack 
helicopters, both of which come from a Marine Light Attack 
Helicopter Squadron.  A fixed-wing capability is provided 
by six AV-8B Harriers from a Marine Attack Squadron. [Ref 
7] 
The MEU CSSE is designated as a MEU Service Support 
Group (MSSG).  The MSSG consists of a staff, a supply 
detachment, a maintenance detachment, a motor transport 
detachment, a landing support detachment, a communications 
section, a health services detachment, an engineer support 
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detachment, a military police section, as well as 
disbursing and postal representatives. [Ref 7] 
 These then are the forces that the force commander can 
draw from in order to accomplish the various missions he 
may encounter while on deployment.  Depending on the 
mission, the commander will draw up a different force 
package of people and equipment. 
 
2. Mission Types 
The mission types used in the simulation model were 
drawn from Captain Robert Hagan’s Master’s Thesis, Modeling 
Sea-Based Sustainment of Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 
Operations Capable)(MEU(SOC)) Operations Ashore [Ref 7].  
Captain Hagan detailed five missions that a MEU(SOC) was 
likely to face and was capable of accomplishing.  For those 
missions he provides realistic situations along with likely 
force compositions and a brief concept of operations for 
each mission. 
From these five missions, three were chosen for this 
study.  These missions were chosen to provide a range of 
force requirements of low, medium and high that, in turn, 
produce low, medium and high sustainment requirements.  The 
three missions chosen and used in the simulation model of 
this study are Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, 
Non-Permissive Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, and 





a. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
(HA/DR) 
Situation:  A natural disaster has occurred in a 
developing nation resulting in a situation similar to 
Bangladesh following a 1991 typhoon.  The deployment of a 
Joint Task Force (JTF) is hampered by extensive damage to 
the nation’s infrastructure such as strategic lift capable 
airfields and ports.  A deployed MEU(SOC) is deployed to 
provide an initial stabilizing response and to prepare for 
the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. [Ref 7] 
 
Force Composition:  The force for this mission is 
built around the MEU(SOC)’s ability to generate and 
distribute logistical support.  There is little need for 
command and control from the CE and security forces from 
the GCE.  In addition to personnel, the GCE also 
contributes Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and AAAVs for all 
terrain distribution capability and combat engineers for 
their construction skills.  The ACE provides its bulk fuel 
capability and some communications assets.  The CSSE 
provides the majority of the people and equipment ashore 
including motor transportation and health service 
capabilities. [Ref 7] 
 
Concept of Operations:  Establish the force 
ashore in order to distribute relief supplies, provide 
potable water, assist in the clearing of debris, provide 
power generation in priority areas, and provide medical 
assistance.  The focus of effort is delivery of relief 
supplies in the near future.  Shore based storage for 
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potable water, fuel, and dry supplies for MEU(SOC) forces 
is limited.  Sustainment requirements were determined only 
for the force ashore as they prepare for the arrival of the 
relief supplies to be distributed. [Ref 7] 
 
b. Non-Permissive Non-Combatant Evacuation 
Operation (NEO(N-P)) 
Situation:  Civil disorder in a developing nation 
is rapidly deteriorating into chaos.  The host nation has 
lost its ability to control the situation.  A number of 
United States’ citizens require evacuation.  As a result, a 
larger, more capable force is required.  A deployed 
MEU(SOC) is ordered to conduct the mission. [Ref 7] 
 
Force Composition:  The larger force results 
mainly from an increase of the GCE, which now includes some 
command sections ashore.  Additionally, the ACE provides a 
forward refueling capability for what could evolve into a 
mission of longer duration.  The CSSE’s contribution also 
grows to deliver a robust Evacuation Control Center (ECC). 
[Ref 7] 
 
Concept of Operations:  Deploy the security 
force, the ECC, and the liaison and coordination elements 
of the CE.  Conduct the evacuation. [Ref 7] 
 
c. Enabling Force Operation 
Situation:  An ongoing border dispute between two 
developing nations has intensified with the invasion of one 
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nation by the other.  The invaded nation has requested 
intervention by the United States.  A deployed MEU(SOC) is 
directed to seize and secure both a port and an airfield to 
enable the deployment of follow-on forces. [Ref 7] 
 
Force Composition:  This mission requires the 
entire GCE ashore with the exception of the CE.  Under 
OMFTS concepts command and control will be exercised from 
the Sea Base.  The ACE provides air control communications, 
refueling and anti-air assets.  The CSSE provides motor 
transportation, general engineering, landing support, and 
maintenance assets. [Ref 7] 
 
Concept of Operations:  Establish a force ashore 
to include artillery in order to seize and secure the port 
and airfield. [Ref 7] 
 
 Table 1 summarizes the key information for each 
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Table 1.  Mission Development Summary.  After Ref [7]. 
 
3. Distances 
Three distances (radius) from the sea base to the 
forces deployed ashore were chosen for the simulation 
model:  50, 100, and 150 miles.  50 miles was chosen as the 
minimum distance directly from Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 
where it is envisioned as the minimum standoff distance of 
the Sea Base from a hostile shore when delivering assets 
via the air.  100 and 150 miles were chosen as round 
multiples of the minimum distance that would stretch the 
limits of the OMFTS concept. 
Increasing the distance decreases the payload of the 
MV-22 because of fuel constraints.  This reduced payload 
results in more sorties required within the given flight 
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hours available in a day creating a potential point of 
failure for the OMFTS concept. 
 
4. Aviation Assets 
The HMM component of the MEU(SOC)’s ACE for this 
simulation consists of 12 MV-22 Ospreys and four CH-53E 
Super Stallions. 
 
a. MV-22 Osprey 
The MV-22 Osprey is the Marine Corps replacement 
for the CH-46E medium lift assault helicopters.  The MV-22 
is a tilt-rotor aircraft, which can take off and land 
vertically like a helicopter, then fly like an airplane.  
Using this technology, the MV-22 will be able to travel 
further, at much higher speeds and with a much larger 
payload than the fleet of aircraft that it is replacing.  
The MV-22 has not been introduced to the fleet yet and has 
recently encountered programmatic difficulties, but it is 
envisioned to be fully operational by 2010. [Ref 7] 
The MV-22 will not provide a great speed 
advantage with regards to the movement of external loads 
since its speed, in this case, will be constrained by the 
load’s profile.  The speed of a MV-22 carrying an external 
load is 167 knots [Ref 10].   Unladen, the MV-22 flies at 
230 knots [Ref 10].  MV-22 deliveries of cargo will be 
accomplished via external means because of constraints 
imposed by cabin dimensions and cargo floor weight 
limitations. [Ref 7] 
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Because the model takes into consideration the 
tradeoff between range and payload below, the total 
available flight time of a single aircraft is constant.  
This results because the reduction in payload is replaced 
with additional fuel to ensure the aircraft can reach the 
extended distance.  For the MV-22s in this analysis, total 
flight time between refuelings is assumed to be 4 hours.  
 
b. CH-53E Super Stallion 
The CH-53E Super Stallion is the Marine Corps 
heavy transport helicopter.  While this helicopter can 
accomplish the same missions as the MV-22, the CH-53E is 
mostly utilized for its ability to externally lift heavy 
oversized equipment.  The CH-53E is also used tactically 
for its capability to position/reposition artillery units 
in support of reducing the effects of enemy counter-battery 
fire.  [Ref 7] 
In this simulation model, the four CH-53E of the 
ACE are not used for sustainment requirement sorties.  They 
are reserved for heavy lift missions the MV-22s are not 
capable of accomplishing such as artillery or heavy 
equipment movement or for transporting heavy equipments to 
the Sea Base for maintenance. 
 
c. Range vs. Payload 
For helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft, there is 
a direct trade-off between useful load and fuel.  The 
cargo’s weight as well as the packaging of the cargo also 
limits the movement of cargo.  Water and fuel are 
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transported in 500-gallon bladders while MREs and 
ammunition are transported with nets loaded with pallets. 
Table 2 provides the maximum payload for each 









Table 2. Mission Radius vs. Cargo Payload.  After Ref [6] 
 
Each bladder of water weighs 4,650 pounds 
including the weight of the bladder [Ref 11].  Each bladder 
of fuel weighs 3,685 pounds including the weight of the 
bladder [Ref 11].  A pallet of MREs weighs 1,100 pounds 
based on a weight of 1.46 lb/MRE and the weight of the 
packaging and pallet [Ref 7].  An ammunition pallet weighs 
2,200 pounds including the weight of the packaging and 
pallet. 
Table 3 provides the maximum number of pallets in 
the payload of a single MV-22 for each mission radius.  The 
actual number of pallets of each type of requirement is 
based on the number and type of forces, vehicles, and 














50 10 5 2 3 
100 8 4 2 2 
150 6 3 1 1 
Table 3. Mission Radius vs. Maximum Requirement Payload 
 
d.  Maintenance Requirements 
Over time, aircraft experience breakdowns and 
require maintenance.  This maintenance can be either 
routine, minor organizational-level maintenance or major 
AIMD-level maintenance requiring an intermediate level 
capability to repair the aircraft.  Under the OMFTS 
concept, the Sea Base is assumed to have this capability. 
In the simulation model used here, the MV-22 is 
assumed to have an operational availability of 85 percent 
[Ref 4].  Additionally, the 15 percent of aircraft that 
require maintenance are given an 80 percent chance of 
requiring minor maintenance that takes the aircraft out of 
use for an average period of three hours (180 minutes).  
Major maintenance occurs 20 percent of the time and removes 
the aircraft from service for an average period of 25 days 
(600 hours or 36,000 minutes). 
Both of these maintenance periods were simulated 
using an exponential distribution.  This type distribution 
was used because there is a large amount of variance in the 
data used to calculate the mean.  Data from air-capable 
amphibious ships in the NALDA database was used to 
calculate the mean delay times.  While the mean was equal 
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to 25 days, there were many extreme values.  These extremes 
usually result from the reporting activity being on 
deployment.  Extended supply lines increase the reported 
delay times because the difficulty of obtaining materiel 
and the required replacement spares.  However, the status 
of which ship was on deployment when is unknown.  For 
example, data from the USS Wasp showed a range from five to 
257 days delay.  So, because of the high variance in the 
data and the fact that the true distribution for major 
maintenance for the MV-22 is unknown at this time, an 
exponential distribution was used.  As data becomes 
available as the MV-22 is introduced into the fleet, this 
distribution should be revisited in order to improve the 
results of the model. [Ref 8] 
 
5. Sustainment Requirements 
The daily quantity of each type of sustainment 
requirement is based on the number and type of the forces, 
vehicles and equipment deployed ashore by the force 
commander.  This study uses existing Marine Corps Logistic 
Planning Factors (LPF) published in the MAGTF Data Library.  
Supplies other than the four used in this study were not 
considered significant for the types of missions analyzed.  
In all cases fractional numbers were always rounded up to 
the nearest whole number. 
 
a. Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) 
MREs are consumed at a constant rate of three 
MREs per person per day.  The number of pallets of MREs 




DNM ×=  
Where M  = total daily MRE requirements in pallets 
      N  = number of personnel ashore 
      D = daily MRE requirement per person 
      576 represents a pallet of 48 cases containing 
       12 MREs per case. [Ref 7] 
 
b. Water 
The daily requirement for water among the 
deployed force is dependent on climate, exertion level, 
hygiene, and equipment types.  Water usage can range from 4 
to 10 gallons per day per person.  For this study, the 
usage rate is 6 gallons per day per person [Ref 16].  The 




WNH ×=  
Where H  = daily water requirement in bladders 
      N  = number of personnel ashore 
      W  = daily water planning factor in gallons 
      500 represents the number of gallons per 
          water bladder. [Ref 7] 
 
c. Ammunition 
Ammunition requirements are a function of 
ammunition type, weapon type, threat, and the phase of 
combat.  The number of pallets of ammunition required each 














Where A = total daily ammunition requirements in 
           pallets 
      ijQ  = rounds per day for ammunition type i 
           used by weapon type j 
      iY  = weight of ammunition type i round in 
           pounds 
      jV  = number of weapon type j ashore 
      2,200 represents the number of pounds of 
            ammunition that can be loaded on a 
            single pallet. [Ref 7] 
 
d. Fuel 
Fuel requirements are a function of equipment 
type and numbers of equipments deployed ashore.  For each 
item of equipment, a daily requirement is computed based on 
planning factors for gallons per hour and operating hours 












Where F  = daily fuel requirements in bladders 
      jX  = fuel use in gallons per hour for 
           equipment type j 
      jY  = operational hours per day for equipment 
           type j 
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      jE  = number of equipment type j ashore 
      500 represents the number of gallons per 
          fuel bladder. [Ref 7] 
 
Table 4 summarizes the daily requirements in 
pallets for food and ammunition and bladders for fuel and 














HA/DR 3 5 10 0 0 
NEO(N-P) 4 8 10 7 2 
Enabling 
Force 
8 19 20 29 7 
Table 4. Mission Daily Sustainment Requirements 
 
6. Other Assumptions 
In addition to the parameters discussed previously, 
there are several additional assumptions that affect the 
simulation model developed for this analysis. 
First, it is assumed that the enemy air defenses and 
air assets were neutralized prior to the insertion of the 
Marines.  Thus there is no attrition to the MV-22s flying 
resupply missions due to enemy action in this simulation 
model.  Support for this assumption can be drawn from 
recent examples of United States intervention in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and the Gulf War. 
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Secondly, this analysis assumes the entire force that 
will be deployed has been deployed prior to the start of 
the resupply missions.  Therefore, there is little 
requirement for aircraft to ferry personnel from the Sea 
Base to the shore.  This leaves all MV-22s initially 
available for resupply sorties.  Any requirement for minor 
reinforcement or medical evacuation is assumed to be filled 
by the ACE complement of UH-1N utility helicopters.  
Lastly, it is assumed that the MEU(SOC) forces that 
were deployed ashore did not secure any beachhead and are 
sufficiently far enough away from any usable beaches to 
preclude the use of any sort of surface transportation to 
deliver the sustainment requirements.  This includes both 
the Sea Base’s complement of LCACs and any other 
lighterage. 
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IV. SIMULATION MODEL 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A simulation model provides the means to replicate a 
system or process over a period of time without expending 
the resources required for an experiment with the physical 
system.  Relatively inexpensive computing power that is 
readily available has greatly expanded and encouraged the 
use of this capability. 
The simulation model developed for use in this 
analysis is based on the OMFTS and SBL concepts.  It 
incorporates the elements and boundaries of the scenario 
detailed in Chapter III.  The purpose of the simulation is 
to create a virtual system and then exercise it in order to 
measure its performance under the varying conditions of the 
simulation model. 
This chapter provides a description of the simulation 
model used in this analysis.  It describes the logic behind 
the model and how the model functions in order to create 




The simulation model created for this analysis was 
done using the Arena simulation software.  In order to work 
through the logic of the simulation model in an organized 
manner, the discussion of the simulation is broken down 
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into the following areas:  Shore, MREs, Ammunition, Fuel 
and Water, MV-22, General Resources and Statistics. 
The logic flow for each of these areas is discussed, 
but the reader must keep in mind that these areas do not 
operate independently.  Each of the areas is interconnected 
with the others and operate as an integrated whole to 
produce the complete, continuous system model.  
Additionally, it is important to note that the simulation 
model operates in the same fashion no matter which of the 
sustainment requirements levels (HA/DR, NEO(N-P), or 
Enabling Force scenarios) is input into the model. 
 
1. Shore 
The objective of the area of the model depicting the 
forces ashore is to generate a constant, daily demand for 
sustainment requirements and to receive the requirements 
via MV-22 Osprey from the Sea Base LHD. 
The simulation begins at time 0000 hours.  The forces 
are assumed to have deployed the previous day.  For the 
purposes of the analysis it is also assumed that they have 
two full days of supply onhand at the beginning of the 
simulation.  Any supplies needed for the first day’s 
deployment and limited operations were taken with the 
forces in addition to the two days of supply (DOS) in their 
limited, mobile combat logistics trains. 
At time 0000 hours an entity is created in the model 
and then immediately delayed for 20 hours.  This delay 
approximates the first full day of the operations where the 
Marines consume one of their two DOS onhand.  At 2000 hours 
the deployed forces relay their sustainment requirements 
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back to the Sea Base as envisioned in the OMFTS concept.  
The requirements are not reported until the Marines cease 
operating for the day and therefore, it is too late in the 
day for the MV-22s to fly resupply missions.   
The entity is then delayed 24 more hours.  At that 
point, it is 2000 hours of day two.  Again, requirements 
are transmitted to the Sea Base.  This loop continues 
indefinitely, creating a “pull system” for the daily demand 
of sustainment requirements as listed in Table 4. 
On the second day beginning at 0700 MV-22s begin 
bringing the sustainment requirements requested the 
previous evening.  The amount of time required for the 
aircraft to arrive is based on the speed of the aircraft 
when carrying an external load, 167 knots, and the distance 
between the Sea Base and the deployed forces (50, 100, or 
150 miles).  Once the aircraft drops its load it is routed 
back to the Sea Base at 230 knots. 
Aircraft will continue to shuttle between the Sea Base 
and the deployed forces until all of the daily requirements 
have been delivered or until 1900 hours each day of the 
simulation.  This provides for 12 hours of available flight 
time for each aircraft each day. 
Once the aircraft have dropped off their loads, the 
loads are sorted according to the type of commodity (MRE, 
ammo, fuel, water).  They are split from the MV-22 load 
batch size based on Table 3 into individual pallets.  The 
number of pallets is then counted and compared to the 




The objective of the MRE area of the simulation is to 
create the daily quantity of MRE pallets required by the 
forces ashore and then move them to the staging area on the 
flight deck where they are picked up by a MV-22 for 
transport to the shore. 
When the scenario reaches 0000 hours (1440 minutes of 
scenario clock time) of the second day a number of entities 
representing pallets of MREs are created in Hold X of the 
LHD-class ship.  No pallets are created on the first day of 
the simulation.  This is because the Marines ashore are in 
the act of consuming a DOS and will not communicate their 
sustainment requirements until the end of day one.  The 
number of MRE pallets created is equal to the daily 
requirement generated by and dependent on the size of the 
force deployed ashore as shown in Table 4.  This is then 
repeated every 24 hours. 
Following their creation in Hold X, the MRE pallets 
are placed on Elevator 5 in order to get from the hold to 
the Aircraft Hangar Deck.  The pallets are grouped into 
batches of no more than four to conform to the capacity 
restrictions of Elevator 5. 
The time required for the elevator to move between 
decks is simulated using a uniform distribution with a 
minimum of two minutes and a maximum of three minutes.  The 
uniform distribution was chosen because it bounds the 
elevator speed on both sides of the distribution.  The 
minimum time required is based on an empty elevator moving 
between decks while the maximum time required is based on 
the elevator moving between Hold X and the Hangar Deck with 
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a capacity load.  Because the weight placed on the elevator 
varies with the batch size up to the maximum size and/or 
weight limits, all values between the minimum and maximum 
times are equally likely but will not exceed the minimum 
and maximum.  Uniform distributions are utilized for the 
movement of all elevators in the simulation for these 
reasons. 
Once Elevator 5 reaches the Hangar Deck, the pallets 
are removed from the elevator and moved one pallet at a 
time via forklift to the Aircraft Elevator located at the 
starboard aft corner of the ship.  The movement times of 
the hangar deck forklifts, like the elevators is controlled 
using a uniform distribution.  The reasoning is the same, 
with the minimum time based on an empty forklift and the 
maximum time based on a fully loaded forklift. 
At the Aircraft Elevator the pallets are grouped into 
batches of no more than 20 to conform to the capacity 
restrictions of the Aircraft Elevator.  The Aircraft 
Elevator then moves the pallets up to the flight deck.  A 
uniform distribution is again used to simulate the required 
times of the elevator.  For this elevator the minimum time 
is two minutes and the maximum time is four minutes. 
Once the pallets reach the flight deck, they are again 
moved one at a time by forklift.  Just like the hangar deck 
forklifts, these flight deck forklifts’ movement times are 
managed using a uniform distribution with a minimum of two 
minutes and a maximum of four minutes.  The pallets are 
moved to a staging area to be batched for transport by the 
MV-22s.  The maximum batch size for the movement ashore is 
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based on the distance between the forces ashore and the Sea 
Base as shown in Table 3. 
 
3. Ammunition 
The objective of the Ammunition area of the simulation 
is to create the daily quantity of ammunition pallets 
required by the forces ashore and then move them to the 
staging area on the flight deck where they are picked up by 
a MV-22 for transport to the shore. 
When the scenario reaches 0000 hours of the second day 
a number of entities representing pallets of ammunition are 
created in Hold 1 of the LHD-class ship.  No ammunition 
pallets are created on the first day of the simulation for 
the same reason discussed in the MRE subsection.  The 
number of ammunition pallets created is equal to the daily 
requirement generated by and dependent on the size of the 
force deployed ashore as shown in Table 4.  This is then 
repeated every 24 hours. 
Following their creation in Hold 1, the ammunition 
pallets are placed on Elevator 1 in order to get from the 
hold to the Flight Deck.  The pallets are grouped into 
batches of no more than four to conform to the capacity 
restrictions of Elevator 1.  The movement time of this 
elevator is managed by a uniform distribution just like the 
elevators used to move the MRE pallets.  The minimum time 
for Elevator 1 is four minutes and the maximum time is six 
minutes to move from Hold 1 up to the Flight Deck. 
Once the pallets reach the Flight Deck, they are moved 
one at a time via the flight deck forklifts governed by the 
uniform distribution times listed in the MRE subsection.  
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They are moved to a staging area to be batched for 
transport by the MV-22s.  The maximum batch size for the 
movement ashore is based on the distance between the forces 
ashore and the Sea Base as shown in Table 3. 
 
4. Fuel and Water 
The objective of the Fuel and Water areas of the 
simulation is to create the daily quantity of fuel and 
water bladders required by the forces ashore and then move 
them to the staging area on the Flight Deck where they are 
picked up by a MV-22 for transport to the shore. 
As in the previous areas of the model, fuel and water 
bladders are created at 0000 hours of the second day.  
Following their creation the fuel and water bladder 
entities are delayed 30 minutes to approximate the time 
required to fill the bladders on the Flight Deck.  Once the 
pallets are filled, they are moved one at a time via the 
flight deck forklifts, governed by the uniform distribution 
already described, to a staging area to be batched for 
transport by the MV-22s.  The maximum batch size for the 
movement ashore is based on the distance between the forces 
ashore and the Sea Base as shown in Table 3. 
 
5. MV-22 
The objective of the MV-22 area of the simulation is 
to create the MEU(SOC)s complement of 12 MV-22s, match them 
with batches of commodities for transport ashore and return 
them to the Sea Base for matching with another batch of 
commodities.  This process is a continuous loop and also 
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includes logic for refueling and maintenance of the 
aircraft. 
After the creation of the MV-22 entities, they move to 
a waiting station.  Now, for the simulations performed for 
this study, it was assumed there were 12 available flight 
hours, 0700 hours to 1900 hours, for the MV-22s to use.  In 
order to simulate these hours and prevent the MV-22s from 
flying outside of these hours, a variable called “Flag” was 
incorporated into the model.  And, depending on the value 
of the Flag variable, the MV-22s were either able to depart 
the Sea Base or prevented from departing. 
So, following their creation, the MV-22s arrive at a 
waiting station.  There they check the value of the Flag 
variable.  If the Flag is equal to one, aircraft are 
allowed to proceed forward, pick up a batch of commodities 
for delivery, and depart the ship for the shore landing 
zone.  If, however, the Flag is equal to two, no aircraft 
may proceed beyond the waiting station until the value of 
the Flag changes back to one. 
The value of the Flag variable is controlled by a 
logic chain independent from the rest of the simulation 
model.  At the beginning of the simulation (0000 hours of 
the first day) a single entity is created in this logic 
chain.  It is then delayed seven hours, until 0700 hours.  
Once the entity continues on, it changes the value of the 
Flag variable to one.  The entity is then delayed for 12 
hours creating the 12 hours of available flight time.  At 
time 1900 hours, the entity changes the Flag variable back 
to a value of two, halting all flight.  The entity is then 
delayed another 12 hours (until 0700 hours the next day) 
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and returned to the module that changes the Flag variable 
back to one.  This process continues in a continuous loop 
for the rest of the model creating a flight window from 
0700 hours until 1900 hours every day of the simulation. 
If the MV-22 entities are allowed to fly, they seize 
one of the available landing spots on the Sea Base ship and 
are then matched with a batch of commodities.  The entity 
is then delayed five minutes to approximate the time 
required to hook up the nets used to transport batches of 
pallets and to clear the Sea Base area.  The MV-22 then 
releases the landing spot, making it available to another 
MV-22 and then continues on to deliver the batch of 
commodities to the forces ashore. 
The amount of time required for the aircraft to travel 
to the shore is based on the speed of the aircraft when 
carrying an external load, 167 knots, and the distance 
between the Sea Base and the deployed forces (50, 100, or 
150 miles).  Each of the route times for the three 
different distances is governed by a triangular 
distribution.  This is because there is a minimum time for 
the flight because the distance and the maximum allowable 
speed with an external load are fixed values.  The aircraft 
can cover the distance in no less time than the minimum, 
but can exceed this time.  This longer route time could be 
a function of the pilot’s experience, weather, profile of 
the load or several other factors not quantifiable in this 
study. 
Because of the need to bound the distribution for the 
flight times on the left with a minimum and still maintain 
a realistic mean time for the route time, a triangular 
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distribution was used.  The minimum parameter is the amount 
of time required to cover the distance from the Sea Base to 
the forces ashore at the maximum speed, 167 knots.  The 
mode for the distribution was made to be slightly higher as 
the distance increased.  For instance, the minimum and mean 
of the shortest distance is 18 and 19 minutes respectively 
while the mininum and mean for the longest distance is 54 
and 57 minutes respectively.  The maximums for the route 
times were also adjusted according to the distance to 
cover.  This simulates the effect of the longer flight time 
allowing for more factors to affect the aircraft or pilot 
and slowing the delivery time. 
Upon reaching the landing zone the MV-22 is delayed 
five minutes to approximate the time required to approach 
the landing zone and then disengage its external load.  The 
MV-22 then returns to the Sea Base to pick up another batch 
of commodities for delivery.  The route times back to the 
Sea Base are treated in the same manner as the route times 
from the Sea Base.  There is a difference, however, in the 
maximum speed of the aircraft.  Since it no longer carries 
an external load, this speed is 230 knots. 
When the MV-22 arrives at the Sea Base the model 
checks to see if the aircraft requires fuel or maintenance.  
The first check is for maintenance.  85% of the returning 
aircraft are forwarded to the refueling check station while 
15% are sent to have maintenance done.  This approximates 
the targeted .85 operational availability of the MV-22 [Ref 
4].  This approach method may result in a lower than 
targeted operational availability in the long run, however, 
  47
for this study it is assumed it is acceptable for the 
short-term scenarios that are simulated. 
Of the aircraft that require maintenance, 20% will 
require intermediate maintenance by the AIMD of the Sea 
Base while the other 80% will only require minor, 
organizational maintenance.  This 80/20 split is based on 
discussions with former and current AIMD Maintenance 
Officers with significant operational experience with both 
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. 
Those aircraft requiring organizational maintenance 
are delayed a period of time defined by an exponential 
distribution with a mean of three hours as its parameter.  
These parameters were also derived from discussions with 
former and current AIMD Maintenance Officers with 
significant operational experience with both fixed-wing and 
rotary-wing aircraft. 
These organizational-level repairs are those that 
require minimal or no post-maintenance testing and are 
concerned with replacing items on the airframe that are 
easily accessible.  Examples include fuse replacement or 
replacing a windshield wiper assembly. 
Those aircraft requiring AIMD maintenance are delayed 
a period of time defined by an exponential distribution 
with a mean of 25 days as its parameter.  These parameters 
were derived from the NALDA database.  It is based on 
reported a Repairable Item Turn-Around Time Summary for 
aviation-capable amphibious ships for the period July 2000 
to July 2001. 
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These AIMD-level repairs are those requiring 
repairables as well as significant post-maintenance testing 
or phase maintenance testing requirements and/or require 
significant disassembly of various aircraft systems to 
access the failed part or module.  Examples include repair 
or replacement of the radar or communication system modules 
or repair work on a significant system such as the 
hydraulics. 
The refueling check is accomplished by means of an 
attribute called Refuel Time.  This attribute is initially 
assigned a value equal to whatever the current time is, 
called TNOW in Arena.  This is done after the wait station 
where the MV-22s wait for the Flag variable to change to 
one and just prior to seizing the landing spot for picking 
up a commodity batch for delivery on the first day.  The 
positioning of this attribute assignment allows for the MV-
22s to begin each day with a full load of fuel.  During the 
12 hours each day when flight operations are capable, this 
station is avoided by the entities because the Flag 
variable is equal to one and the MV-22s are not routed to 
the wait station.  Therefore, during the flight operations 
window the value of the Refuel Time attribute must be 
assigned elsewhere. 
When the aircraft returns to the Sea Base, the Refuel 
Time attribute is compared to its time of return.  If the 
difference is greater than 240 minutes (four hours), the 
aircraft is routed for refueling.  The MV-22 entity seizes 
a landing spot on the Sea Base ship and is then delayed to 
approximate refueling based on a triangular distribution. 
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A triangular distribution is used here because there 
is a “most likely” time with some variation around that 
time and a minimum and maximum time.  The distribution is 
bounded on the lower end by the flow rates of the various 
valves involved in the fuel transfer bounded on the upper 
end by the level of experience of the personnel performing 
the transfer.   This triangular distribution that controls 
the refueling time is defined by the minimum, mode, and 
maximum values of 15, 20, and 30 minutes [Ref 10]. 
Following this delay, the Refuel Time attribute is 
reset to the current time, TNOW, allowing for a further 
four hours of flight time.  The entity then releases the 
landing spot, making it available once again and is 
returned to service with the rest of the MV-22s. 
Additionally, it is assumed that those aircraft that 
are delayed for maintenance will also be refueled during 
its maintenance delay time.  Following the maintenance 
delay the aircraft are returned to service with the rest of 
the available MV-22s. 
 
6. General Resources 
Resources in Arena simulations act as pools that the 
entities of the system draw upon to fill a need.  In order 
to utilize the resource, an entity first seizes one of the 
available resources.  This resource is then unavailable to 
any other entity in the simulation.  Once the entity has 
used the resource for its intended purpose, it releases the 
resource.  This returns the resource to the pool to be 
drawn upon by other entities.  If there are no resources 
available, the entity must queue up and wait for one of the 
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resources to become available.  Two elements of the 
simulation model were modeled as resources:  flight deck 
forklifts and landing spots for the aircraft. 
The flight deck forklifts were modeled as resources 
because of the difficulty of simulating the forklifts 
selecting which of the four commodities to retrieve and 
move to the staging area to await an available MV-22.  By 
defining the forklifts as resources, the entities 
representing the individual commodity pallets or bladders 
seize a forklift, utilize it, and then release for use by 
the next entity.  Used in this manner, the forklifts no 
longer choose the commodity to move.  The commodities 
themselves select them. 
The landing spots on the Sea Base ship were modeled as 
resources because there is competition for their use from 
both the departing MV-22s and the returning MV-22s that 
require refueling.  Additionally, modeling these assets as 
a resource simplified changing their quantity within the 
model for sensitivity analysis purposes.  The default 
initial value for the number of landing spots on the Sea 
Base is two for all scenarios. 
 
7. Statistics 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the 
number significant to this analysis is the percentage of 
daily sustainment requirements delivered each day.  In 
order to capture this data, a short logic chain was added 
to the model.  While this chain is part of the simulation 
model, its presence in no way affects the function of the 
OMFTS system being simulated. 
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What the logic chain does do is read the number of 
pallets or bladders left on the Sea Base, at the point on 
the Flight Deck where the commodity batches are matched 
with MV-22s, at 0000 hours of each day of the simulation.  
It also reads, also at 0000 hours, the number of pallets 
and bladders that arrived at the shore each day.  This data 
is written to a worksheet file.  Once the data has been 
captured in the worksheet file, the data will then be used 
to determine the daily delivery percentage.  It will also 
be used to develop an average daily delivery percentage and 
standard deviation across a number of replications of the 
same simulation. 
This logic chain also reads the time at which the last 
of each of the four pallet types are delivered each day.  
This was done to determine the utilization of the aircraft 
during the various days of each simulation.  By knowing the 
time the delivery of all sustainment requirements is 
completed, on average, is very useful information for the 
operational commander who has many conflicting uses, 
missions and opportunities for the aviation and sea assets 
of his command to juggle. 
Another statistical issue with this simulation is how 
to treat variability.  Variability is introduced into the 
simulation in the movement times of elevators, aircraft, 
and forklifts as well as the refueling and maintenance 
times for the MV-22s.  Different probability distributions, 
depending on the data available and the process involving 
the movements, govern these movement times and were 
discussed as they were encountered in the logic of the 
simulation model. 
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The variance of the simulation output is reduced in 
the simulation model by two methods.  In the first 
instance, Arena software makes use of a random number 
generator that can be controlled by use of the SEEDS 
module.  By using the SEEDS module, the starting point on 
the random number generator is dictated to the model.  
Therefore, as each replication is run, variance from any 
source other than the various probability distributions 
throughout the model is minimized, increasing the validity 
of the results.  This is referred to as Common Random 
Number Variance Reduction Technique.  Using the same 
starting point on the random number generator also allows 
for more valid results during sensitivity analysis by 
ensuring that any differences in the results are actually a 
result of the changes to the model inputs rather than the 
starting position on the generator. 
In order to obtain these benefits, the SEEDS module 
was used in the simulation model to dictate the starting 
point on the random number generator for each instance 
where a process was governed by a distribution.  This 
includes the various elevator and forklift movement times, 
refueling and maintenance processes, and the flight time 
between the Sea Base and the shore. 
Secondly, each combination of the simulation (three 
force packages each at three distances) is replicated 30 
times.  This will produce an array of results whose 
distribution will approximate a normal distribution in 
accordance with the Central Limit Theorem.  This normal 
distribution can then be used to make inferences about the 
simulation results. 
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
A. EXPERIMENT 
 The purpose of the experiment was to test the 
parameters that critically impact the ability of a LHD-
class ship to provide basic sustainment requirements (food, 
water, fuel, ammunition) to a typical MEU(SOC) under the 
OMFTS concept.  The critical parameters for this experiment 
were the size of the force deployed, which affected the 
quantity of sustainment requirements that were to be 
delivered, the initial number of aircraft assigned to the 
Sea Base, and the distance between the deployed forces and 
the Sea Base. 
Recall Table 4 from Chapter III.  It showed the 
sustainment requirements for the three different types of 
missions.  The missions were Humanitarian Assistance/ 
Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Non-combatant Evacuation Operation 
(Non-Permissive) (NEO(N-P)), and Enabling Force.  
Additionally, there were two different ammunition 
requirements depending on whether the Marines were 
assaulting an objective or sustaining their position:  an 
assault rate and a sustainment rate of ammunition 
consumption.  Combining these two results in five different 
scenarios:  HA/DR, NEO(N-P)(Sustain Rate), NEO(N-P)(Assault 
Rate), Enabling Force(Sustain Rate), and Enabling 
Force(Assault Rate).  Because there was no ammunition 
expenditure for the HA/DR mission, there was no need to 
break out that mission according to ammunition consumption. 
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These five scenarios were then each tested over the 
three different distances between the deployed forces and 
the Sea Base:  50, 100, and 150 miles.  This results in a 
total of 15 different scenarios. 
Each of the 15 different scenarios was run for 30 
replications in order to produce a sufficient sample size 
for meaningful statistical analysis.  The system and 
statistics were set to initialize at the start of each 
replication. 
During each of the 30 replications the total number of 
pallets of each of the four commodities (MRE, Ammo, Fuel, 
Water) was recorded on a daily basis.  This was then 
compared to the sustainment requirement (total number of 
pallets of all commodities) from Table 4 to determine the 
daily delivery percentage.  100 percent delivery each day 
is, of course, the target figure.  Also recorded was the 
time that the last pallet of each of the four commodities 
was delivered each day.  This was done so that on the days 
when 100 percent delivery was achieved, a measure of 
aircraft utilization for that day could be extracted from 
the model. 
There were three other measures recorded for each of 
the 30 replications as well.  They were the number of MV-2 
sorties, the number of aircraft requiring AIMD maintenance 
and the number of aircraft requiring minor maintenance.  
These measures were taken for the entire 15 days of the 




B.  RESULTS 
Upon completion of the various scenario runs, the 
output data files were manipulated to calculate an average 
daily delivery percentage for each of the 15 days for each 
of the 15 different scenarios.  The standard deviation was 
also calculated.  If any day of the individual scenarios 
did not achieve 100 percent delivery, it was considered a 
failure.  Table 5 summarizes the success rate of each of 
the 15 scenarios.  Missions executed successfully are noted 
with a “Y”, unsuccessful mission with a “N”. 
 
 
Distance (miles)  
Mission 50 100 150 
Ammunition 
Rate 
HA/DR Y Y Y N/A 
Y Y Y Sustain 
NEO(N-P) 
Y Y N Assault 
N N N Sustain Enabling 
Force N N N Assault 
Table 5.  Mission Success Summary 
 
These results indicate that the size of the force, 
which determines the quantity of sustainment requirements, 
and the distance between the deployed forces and the Sea 
Base were the key determinants that determined whether or 
not success was achieved for the missions.   
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The largest mission force package, comprised of 1500 
Marines, was the Enabling Force.  This results in these 
missions having the greatest sustainment requirements to be 
delivered.  Additionally, missions with an assault rate of 
ammunition consumption added an additional 22 pallets of 
ammunition, 29 total pallets versus 7 total pallets for the 
sustainment rate, to the sustainment requirements. 
Distance between the Sea Base and the forces ashore 
affects the outcome of the simulation in two ways.  First, 
the larger the separation distance, the less a single MV-22 
can transport in a single sortie.  Table 3 in Chapter III 
summarized the decrease in payload that comes with 
increased transport distances.  Second, longer flight times 
mean there are relatively fewer MV-22s available on the Sea 
Base waiting for a batch of commodities to transport 
ashore.  Simply put, longer distances means there are more 
aircraft in the air at any given time compared to shorter 
distances. 
The longer flight times and lesser payload 
capabilities make the availability of the aviation assets 
more important.  Removal of a single aircraft has a greater 
impact on the missions with longer distances and greater 
delivery requirements.  Removal from the mission because of 
maintenance requirements takes on greater importance in 
determining the success of the mission.  For these reasons, 
the number of available aircraft also becomes a key 
determinant of the success or failure of the various 
missions. 
Inspection of the average daily delivery percentage 
for each of the scenarios backs up these insights.  Table 6 
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Forces 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
HA/DR N/A 50 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
150 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
NEO(N-P) S 50 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
150 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 A 50 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
150 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 98 100 98 96 93 93 
Enabling 
Force 
S 50 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 90 
100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 95 96 91 92 93 87  
150 0 100 100 100 100 97 96 89 76 71 61 58 48 44 47 
 A 50 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 97 99 95 98 100 
100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 98 95 95 93 91 88 81 91  
150 0 100 100 100 99 96 92 85 80 64 51 40 33 33 29 
S = Sustain  A = Assault 
Table 6.  Daily Delivery Percentage Summary 
 
 The pattern of failure begins with the NEO(N-P) 
mission (assault rate) at the greatest distance, 150 miles.  
Failure of this mission indicates that it is the distance 
and the resulting increase in importance of the aircraft 
availability that results in mission failure.  Clearly the 
quantity of the sustainment requirements did not exceed the 
capacity of the Sea Base to deliver them.  Only the 
increase in distance from 100 to 150 miles resulted in 
mission failure. 
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 Failure of each of the Enabling Force missions at all 
distances indicates that the quantity of sustainment 
requirements that must be delivered exceeds the Sea Base’s 
ability to deliver them.  Additionally, the incidence of 
failure occurs earlier as the distance between the forces 
and the Sea Base is increased.  This indicates that 
distance continues to play a role in determining mission 
success or failure based on the range versus payload 
argument and the increased importance on the availability 
of a single aircraft argument. 
 
C.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The next step in the study was to conduct sensitivity 
analysis on the simulation parameters.  Recall from the 
previous section that the size of the force deployed 
ashore, the distance between the deployed Marines and the 
Sea Base and the availability of the aviation assets were 
the most important factors that determined mission success 
or failure. 
The size of the deployed force and the resulting 
sustainment requirement quantities is fixed based on the 
mission to be accomplished.  The operational commander 
wouldn’t send a force package suitable to accomplish a 
HA/DR mission to accomplish an Enabling Force mission such 
as assaulting an airfield or fortified position.  The 
reverse is also true.  Also, the distance that lies between 
the Marines ashore and the Sea Base for each scenario also 
remains fixed once the distance for the mission has been 
chosen.  Additionally, the effects of increasing the 
distance was seen in the base experiment because each 
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mission was simulated at three different distances.  For 
these reasons, sensitivity analysis focused on the 
availability of aircraft for the various missions. 
The availability of the aircraft in the simulation 
model can be affected several ways.  It can be directly 
affected by simply increasing or decreasing the number of 
aircraft assigned to the Sea Base at the beginning of the 
simulation.  The availability of aircraft can also be 
affected by manipulating the operational availability input 
parameter of the simulation, the percentage of aircraft 
that require AIMD-level maintenance vice organizational-
level maintenance, and the distribution that defines the 
amount of time an aircraft is delayed for AIMD-level 
maintenance. 
Sensitivity analysis was applied to the number of 
aircraft input to the simulation, the operational 
availability of the aircraft, the number of aircraft 
referred for maintenance that go to AIMD-level maintenance 
(maintenance requirement) and the delay time associated 
with AIMD-level maintenance to try to gather additional 
useful information from this study.  Additionally, the 
number of landing spots available on the Sea Base was also 
varied to see if this limited not the aircraft 
availability, but the aircraft’s ability to be available. 
 
1. Landing Spots 
Recall from the discussion of Landing Spots in the 
General Resources section of Chapter IV.  In the initial 
simulations the landing spots on the Sea Base ship were 
modeled as resources because there is competition for their 
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use from both the departing MV-22s and the returning MV-22s 
that require refueling.  The default initial value for the 
number of landing spots on the Sea Base was two for all 
scenarios. 
Sensitivity analysis was applied to this resource to 
determine if the competition between MV-22s for their use 
affected the aircraft availability and, in turn the success 
or failure of the missions.  The analysis used the most 
difficult mission to accomplish, the Enabling Force 
(assault rate) with a 150-mile separation distance.  The 
number of available landing spots was increased from the 
value during the initial simulation (two) up to the maximum 
number of landing spots of a LHD-class ship (six). 
Increasing the number of landing spots on the Sea Base 
to six had no affect on the success or failure of the 
mission.  The results obtained for the mission simulated 
were exactly the same as when there were only two landing 
spots available. 
 
2. Number of Aircraft 
The next determinant important to the success or 
failure of the mission is the number of aircraft available 
at the beginning of the simulation.  In the initial 
simulations there were 12 MV-22s at the beginning of each 
of the simulations. 
The number of aircraft available at the beginning of 
the mission is important because of the effects of the 
maintenance delays.  The AIMD-level maintenance delay 
effectively removes the affected aircraft from the rest of 
the simulation because of the average length of the delay.  
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By increasing the number of initial aircraft, the affects 
of this delay should be lessened because more aircraft will 
still be in an operational status. 
To test the sensitivity of this input, the Enabling 
Force (assault rate) mission at 150 miles was again used as 
the test scenario.  While there is value if any of the 
other missions that failed in the initial simulations can 
be completed with the addition of aircraft, the number of 
aircraft required to be able to accomplish all of the 
missions successfully provides the most value.  As a 
result, using this mission, the number of aircraft was 
increased incrementally until the Enabling Force (assault 
rate) mission at 150 miles was successfully completed.  The 
operational availability value (.85) and the percentage of 
aircraft requiring AIMD-level maintenance (.2) were held 
constant. 
The minimum number of MV-22s required to successfully 
complete this mission was 27.  This is an increase of 125 
percent over the envisioned complement of MV-22s for a LHD-
class ship.  There was an average of 22 aircraft requiring 
AIMD-level maintenance across the 30 replications of the 
simulation.   
This is a reasonable figure based on the .85 
operational availability and the .2 requiring AIMD-level 
maintenance.  In the simulation model 15 percent of 
aircraft returning to the Sea Base after delivery are sent 
for maintenance.  Of this percentage 20 percent are sent to 
AIMD-level maintenance.  This results in the diversion of 
three percent of all returning aircraft for AIMD-level 
maintenance.  The number of MV-22 sorties required to 
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complete the mission was 714.  Three percent of this number 
is 21.42.  So the average number requiring AIMD-level 
maintenance of 22 is right in line with these projections.  
The accuracy of this measure then lends credence to the 
accuracy of the required increase in MV-22s of 15 to a 
total of 27 MV-22s required to successfully complete the 
most rigorous mission. 
 
3. Operational Availability and Maintenance 
Requirement 
Another way to increase the number of aircraft 
available to execute the given mission is to increase the 
operational availability of the embarked aircraft.  This is 
a difficult task best addressed during the acquisition 
cycle.  However, there are short-term solutions that can 
increase the operational availability of a limited number 
of aircraft.  For instance, additional repairables can be 
added to the inventory of the units maintaining the 
aircraft to reduce the turnaround time for the AIMD-level 
maintenance.  Or the capability of the AIMD can be 
increased or expanded to improve the AIMD’s ability to 
quickly return aircraft to service. 
These examples of short-term solutions reveal the 
inter-connectedness of the AIMD capability and the 
operational availability measure.  As applied to the 
simulation model used in this study this encompasses the 
.85 operational availability parameter as well as the 
requirement that 20 percent of aircraft requiring 
maintenance require AIMD-level maintenance.  To explore 
this relationship further in terms of mission 
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accomplishment in the simulation model two sensitivity 
tests were conducted. 
First, the maintenance requirement was held constant 
and the operational availability input was steadily 
increased until the most rigorous mission (Enabling 
Force/assault rate/150 miles) was successfully completed.  
Second, the operational availability parameter was held 
constant and the maintenance requirement was reduced until 
the same mission was completed successfully.  In both cases 
the distribution governing the delay time associated with 
AIMD-level maintenance (exponential distribution with a 
mean of 25 days) was held constant at the values used in 
the initial simulations.  Also, in both cases the expected 
complement of 12 MV-22s was used for the initial number of 
aircraft.  
The results of the first test of operational 
availability show that an operational availability of 96 
percent is required to accomplish the Enabling Force 
(assault rate) mission at 150 miles given the 20 percent 
AIMD-level maintenance requirement and the delay time 
distribution (EXPO(25 days)).  This means that only four 
percent of returning aircraft can be sent for maintenance.  
Of these, 20 percent are then sent on to AIMD-level 
maintenance.  In effect, in order for the mission to be 
successfully completed, slightly less than one percent 
(.008) of all returning aircraft can be sent to AIMD-level 
maintenance. 
The results of the second test show that only when the 
percentage of aircraft sent on to AIMD-level maintenance is 
four percent or less can the mission be successfully 
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completed.  With the operational availability constant at 
.85 for this sensitivity test, 15 percent of returning 
aircraft are sent for some type of maintenance.  Of these, 
only four percent can be sent for AIMD-level maintenance, 
and the mission still be successfully completed.  The 
percentage aircraft actually going to AIMD-level 
maintenance in this case is very near the one percent 
arrived at in the previous sensitivity test.  It is .006. 
These sensitivity tests show that whether the 
operational availability or the maintenance requirement 
inputs are adjusted, the results are very similar.  One 
percent or less of all MV-22 sorties can result in AIMD-
level maintenance and still provide the ability to 
accomplish the most rigorous mission simulated for this 
study.  This indicates the real culprit for the mission 
failure is the delay time associated with AIMD-level 
maintenance. 
Sensitivity analysis was also applied to the delay 
time for AIMD-level maintenance.  The mean of the standard 
distribution defining this delay was decreased 
incrementally until the Enabling Force (assault rate) 
mission at 150 miles was successfully accomplished.  Both 
the operational availability of .85 and the AIMD-level 
maintenance requirement of .2 of the base simulations were 
used.  The results of this test showed that a 92 percent 
reduction of the exponential mean time for AIMD-level 
maintenance must be achieved in order for this mission to 
be successfully accomplished under the given parameters.  
This equates to a maximum exponential distribution mean 
delay time of 2,880 minutes (48 hours). 
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The results of this test, however, must be taken with 
grain of salt.  Recall that the base data used in the 
simulations was based on NALDA database reports for 
Repairable Item Turn-Around Times for aviation capable 
amphibious ships for the period July 2000 and July 2001.  
The NALDA database does not break out the reporting ships 
data according to whether or not they were on deployment.  
This is significant because deployed ships experience a 
greater Repairable Item Turn-Around Time because of their 
increasing distance from reliable, shore-based supply 
channels.   The value of the turn-around time is also 
greater for deployed ships because these ships have 
aircraft embarked onboard and are performing AIMD-level 
maintenance while ships in their homeport do not.  Because 
the average turn-around time was derived from both deployed 
ships and ships in their homeport, the variance in the data 
is greatly increased resulting in greater possible delay 
times in the simulation model.  On the other hand, if the 
data used to calculate the exponential mean could be 
isolated to only deployed ships the mean turn-around time 
would increase while the variance in the data would 
decrease.  This combination of changes makes it difficult 
to assess the impact this would have on the overall delay 
time experienced in the simulation runs.  
 
4.  Operational Availability, Part II 
A final sensitivity test was performed with the 
operational availability parameter.  In the real world 
operation of any complex system there is quite often a 
disparity in the stated operational availability and the 
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achieved operational availability.  In the case of United 
States Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, the achieved 
operational availability usually lies in the vicinity of 65 
to 70 percent.  This is true for both rotary and fixed-wing 
aircraft. 
Based on an estimate of achieved operational 
availability of .7, sensitivity tests were conducted to 
determine which of the 15 original missions could be 
successfully accomplished and also to determine the initial 
number of aircraft that would be required to accomplish all 
15 missions.  In both cases the AIMD-level maintenance 
requirement of 20 percent and the original AIMD-level delay 
time (EXPO(36000)) were employed. 
In the case of determining the total number of initial 
aircraft required to accomplish all missions, the result 
was a requirement of 53 aircraft available at the beginning 
of the Enabling Force (assault rate) mission with a 
separation distance of 150 miles. 
This is a 342 percent increase over the envisioned 
complement of 12 MV-22s for a LHD-class ship.  There was an 
average of 45 aircraft requiring AIMD-level maintenance 
across the 30 replications of this simulation.  This 
equates to six percent of all aircraft returning from 
delivery sorties.  And this increase is a 105 percent 
increase from the average number of aircraft requiring 
AIMD-level maintenance under the .85 operational 
availability sensitivity test. 
The final sensitivity test was to determine which of 
the 15 missions could be successfully accomplished given a 
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.7 achieved operational availability value.  Table 7 
summarizes the results of this test. 
 
 
Distance (miles)  
Mission 50 100 150 
Ammunition 
Rate 
HA/DR Y Y N N/A 
N N N Sustain 
NEO(N-P) 
N N N Assault 
N N N Sustain Enabling 
Force N N N Assault 
Table 7.  Mission Success Summary 
.70 Achieved Operational Availability 
 
 As can be seen from this table, the capability of the 
Sea Base to provide the required sustainment requirements 
is drastically reduced when the achieved operational 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this study was to analyze the 
capability of a current LHD-class ship to provide sustained 





1. The current LHD-class ship is capable of 
sustaining forces deployed ashore only under OMFTS concepts 
for a limited time.  
The LHD is capable of successfully sustaining the 
Humanitarian (HA/DR) missions at any separation distance 
and all of the Evacuation (NEO(N-P)) missions except at the 
assault rate of ammunition expenditure and a separation of 
150 miles. 
However, it is only capable of sustaining the Enabling 
Force missions for short periods of time.  If this force 
uses a sustaining rate of ammunition expenditure, the force 
can be successfully, 100 percent sustained for 13, eight, 
and five days at 50, 100, and 150 miles respectively.  
Under the assault rate of ammunition expenditure, the force 
can be sustained for nine, seven, and four days at 50, 100, 
and 150 miles respectively. 
OMFTS, however, is about projecting United States 
military power ashore.  And sustaining that projected power 
until national objectives are met.  It is this with which 
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the Enabling Force missions were primarily concerned.  
While it is useful to be able to successfully execute 
humanitarian and evacuation missions, this does not achieve 
national objectives or interests.  Projecting power ashore 
does.  So, placing time limits on the Enabling Force to 
accomplish its missions must be considered a failure to 
achieve the objectives of OMFTS at the present time. 
Several more conclusions can be drawn from the results 
of this study.  These conclusions concern the number of 
transport aircraft needed to successfully complete the 
required missions, the operational availability of the 
transport aircraft, and the AIMD-level maintenance turn-
around time.  Keep in mind too, that each of these three 
topics are intertwined and cannot be completely separated 
as each is dependant on the others for its value. 
 
2.  The proposed complement of 12 MV-22 aircraft for a 
LHD-class ship is insufficient to accomplish all required 
sustainment missions with the given sustainment 
requirements and maintenance factors. 
The number of MV-22s used in the initial simulations 
was 12, the intended complement for a LHD-class ship.  
However, with an operational availability of .85, a minimum 
of 27 MV-22s is needed to accomplish all the Enabling Force 
missions.  With an achieved operational availability of 
.70, a total of 53 MV-22s is required to accomplish all of 
the sustainment missions. 
Even if the MV-22 achieves its intended operational 
availability of .85, there are no where near enough of 
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these aircraft embarked on the LHD to achieve the Enabling 
Force missions.  And, there is not enough space onboard a 
LHD to increase the MV-22 complement to the required number 
of 27, let alone 53.  So the question becomes, where will 
the additional transport capability come from? 
The simulations run for this study included only a 
single ship Sea Base, the LHD, because this is the ship 
around which current ARGs are most often built.  OMFTS, 
however, envisions more than one air capable ship making up 
the Sea Base.  Could sufficient MV-22s be embarked on all 
ships of the Sea Base to meet the mission needs?  That will 
depend on the number and type of ships that constitute the 
Sea Base.  Additionally, OMFTS also envisioned a CVBG being 
located near the Sea Base to provide protection and support 
for both the Sea Base and the deployed forces.  Not only is 
this a resource to embark additional MV-22s, but at the 
least the aircraft carrier at the center of the battlegroup 
contains AIMD-level maintenance capabilities.  This, of 
course, would help to return the MV-22 to mission capable 
status more quickly.  Of course, the carrier AIMD is most 
concerned with its own complement of aircraft, but any 
slack time could be devoted to MV-22 maintenance.  What the 







3.  The current average AIMD-level maintenance delay 
of 25 days for aircraft must be brought down significantly 
in the case of the MV-22 in order to successfully 
accomplish the required sustainment missions. 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are two 
different operational availability figures to consider for 
the MV-22 and accomplishment of the missions of this study.  
These are the planned operational availability of .85 and 
the achieved operational availability that was estimated at 
.70 based on experience with other Naval aircraft.  With 
the given AIMD-level maintenance delay time, neither figure 
for operational availability was capable of providing 
sufficient aircraft to accomplish all of the assigned 
missions. 
Sensitivity analysis showed that, in fact, an 
operational availability of .96 was required to accomplish 
the missions with the heaviest sustainment requirement 
load.  It is practically impossible to achieve a system 
operational availability this high.  The developmental, 
provisioning, life-cycle and other acquisition costs 
preclude achievement of a figure this high. 
On the other hand, with a .85 operational 
availability, only 27 MV-22s are needed vice 53 at the .70 
operational availability figure.  Certainly, it is much 
easier to find room on the various Sea Base ships for an 
additional 15 MV-22s rather than an additional 41. 
There is difficulty, however, in achieving even the 
.85 operational availability figure as evidenced by the 
achieved operational availability figure for most Navy 
airframes of .70.  Operational availability is a function 
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of both the Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) and the 
Maintenance Down Time (MDT) for the aircraft.  A poor 
achieved operational availability points to insufficient 
MTBM and an excessive MDT. 
While actual MTBM and MDT figures from fleet 
operations are currently unknown for the MV-22, the NALDA 
database that was used to derive the AIMD-level maintenance 
delay time provide insight into the MTBMs and MDTs the 
acquisition system has been able to provide the Navy’s 
current inventory of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft.  If 
the MV-22 follows form it will experience a similar lengthy 
average delay time and the resulting low operational 
availability.  And that points the finger for the failure 
to achieve the missions of this study at the excessive 
AIMD-level maintenance delay time.  The MTBM must be of 
sufficient length and the MDT of sufficient brevity to 
achieve the .85 target.  The average delay of 25 days 
experienced currently must be brought down significantly. 
 
4.  The sustainment requirements for forces deployed 
ashore need to be reduced.  Fuel and water requirements are 
the most difficult requirements to transport, but also 
provide the most promise for realizing reductions. 
While the level of sustainment requirements was fixed 
according to the number and type of forces and equipments 
deployed, their volume was a significant factor in the 
success or failure of the sustainment missions.  A clear 
pattern emerges between the missions (HA/DR and NEO) 
requiring lesser sustainment requirements and the Enabling 
Force missions.  The HA/DR and NEO missions either never 
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failed or failed only at the greatest distance when the 
maintenance delay time exerted influence over the success 
or failure of the mission.  However, all of the Enabling 
Force missions failed at some point in time short of the 
15-day sustainment target as a result of the increased 
requirement for sustainment. 
The difference makers, as it were, were the water and 
fuel bladders.  The Enabling Force missions required 
significant increases in these two commodities over the 
NEO(N-P) and HA/DR missions.  Water requirements increased 
almost 300 percent and fuel requirements increased 100 
percent. 
Because of the weight of these containers, this 
increase in requirements significantly increased the number 
of sorties required to transport these commodities ashore.  
At the shortest distances, water bladders can only be 
transported two at a time and fuel bladders three at a 
time.  At the longest distances both can only be 
transported a single bladder at a time.  This requires a 
minimum number of 39 daily sorties just for the fuel and 
water requirements at the longest distance and a minimum of 
17 daily sorties at the shortest distance. 
As has been demonstrated, the more sorties that are 
required the better the chance that the extended 
maintenance delay times will affect the outcome of the 
mission.  Therefore, the increase in requirements for the 
Enabling Force provided a significant impact on the ability 





The sustainment missions of this study that failed 
failed because there were insufficient aircraft, excessive 
AIMD-level maintenance delay times, and excessive 
sustainment requirements to be delivered.  These three 
situations need to be addressed in order to ensure a LHD-
class ship or any future ship designed to accomplish 
operational missions with OMFTS concepts to ensure the 
forces deployed ashore can be properly sustained. 
 
1.  Ensure there is adequate embarkation space on the 
ships of the Sea Base to accommodate sufficient numbers of 
MV-22s to accomplish the sustainment mission. 
The lower the achieved operational availability, the 
more space that will be required.  Sufficiently low 
operational availability will force decisions on the force 
commander they do not want to make.  More MV-22s or the 
regular complement of AV-8s, CH-53s, or other airframe 
types?  The space and maintenance requirements of the true 
required number, not the number based on contractor 
operational availability claims, of MV-22s to accomplish 
the mission must be taken into account when the ship types 






2.  Reduce the AIMD-level maintenance turn-around time 
(MDT) for the MV-22 through improved repairable item turn-
around time and decreased procurement lead times and 
transportation times. 
Excessive delays on non-mission capable aircraft, 
whether waiting for maintenance or repairables, drive down 
operational availability and drive up the number of 
required aircraft to successfully accomplish the 
sustainment mission. 
While it may be too late to affect the MTBM of the MV-
22 at this point in its acquisition cycle, the MTBM should 
still be studied to determine the true operational MTBM as 
well as ways to improve this measure in the future. 
The MDT, on the other hand, is ripe for improvement.  
MDT is made up of not only actual maintenance time, but 
also logistics delay time (LDT) and administrative delay 
time (ADT).  Logistics delay time is probably the most 
important driver of high MDTs.  Naval activities are 
consistently faced with declining budgets to purchase 
spares that increase in cost each year as well as lengthy 
procurement delay times when no spares are available in the 
supply system.  Additionally, transportation times to 
deployed ships adds significant amounts of time to the MDT. 
 
3.  Reduce the quantity of sustainment requirements to 
be delivered ashore via MV-22. 
This can be accomplished in several ways.  First, more 
fuel-efficient vehicles should be developed in order to 
reduce the fuel burden.  Second, find ways to reduce the 
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quantity of water used by the forces ashore.  There are 
minimum required quantities based on sanitation, 
maintenance, and food preparation to any reduction in water 
usage, but methods of recycling some water that can reduce 
the overall gallon per man requirement should be 
engineered.  Third, while not considered in this study, 
unmanned aerial vehicles could be developed to deliver some 
sustainment loads.  Certainly, if they can deliver Hellfire 
missiles into the mouth of a cave in Afghanistan, they can 
be adapted to deliver sustainment requirements.  
Development of vehicles such as this would reduce the 
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